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Roy Chowdhury and Sengupta(2012) study a model of multilateral bargain-
ing involving one buyer and n ≥ 2 sellers. In odd periods buyer makes offers
to all the sellers simultaneously, while in even periods all the sellers demand a
price. If any of the seller accepts buyer’s offer or if the buyer accepts any seller’s
demand, then the buyer pays him immediately and the seller leaves the game.
Rest of the players continue the game in the same fashion. Authors show that
when the buyer has no outside option, his maximum payoff is 1−δ1+δ , which ap-
proaches to zero as δ reaches 1(Roy Chowdhury and Sengupta 2012, Proposition
1). Note that the δ is the discount factor of the players. However, if the buyer
has a positive outside option, however small, his payoff is δ1+δ , which is almost
half of the surplus when δ is very close to 1(Roy Chowdhury and Sengupta 2012,
Proposition 2). This drastic change in the maximum possible payoff to
the buyer captures the impact of outside option on the same. This is
one of the key results of the paper.
The paper assumes common discount factor i.e. all player discount at equal
rate. One main reason for employing such assumption is the ensuing mathemat-
ical comfort. We make following minor change in the model. Buyer discounts
at the rate of δb ∈ (0, 1) per period, while all the sellers discount at the rate of
δs ∈ (0, 1) per period, and δb 6= δs. We show that under limiting conditions
i.e. lim δb, δs → 1, even infinitesimal difference between δb and δs, can
render an outside option ineffective in improving the buyer’s payoff.
This result contradicts the key result of Roy Chowdhury and Sengupta(2012)
described above.
Consider the Condition 1, which basically states that buyer’s discount fac-
tor is more than that of the sellers by an amount which diminishes as players
become more patient.
Condition 1: δb − δs ≥ k, where k = nδs−nδ
2
s+kδ
2
s−k
(n−k)δs and k ∈ (0, 1) is an
arbitrarily chosen number.
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Note that k < 1 − δs ∀ δs ∈ (0, 1). This ensures that δb takes values in the
range (0, 1) for all values of δs. Also, for sufficiently large n,
∂k
∂δs
< 0. As δs
approaches to 1, k approaches to 0, and δb approaches 1 as well.
Proposition 1. Under condition 1 and no outside option for the players, there
exists an equilibrium such that the game ends in the first period and the buyer
receives at least 1-k.
Proof. Following equilibrium strategy profile proves the result.
For n = 1, the game is same as Rubinstein(1982), hence, Rubinstein(1982)
strategies are followed. For n > 1, following strategies are followed. In odd peri-
ods, the buyer offers p to each of the sellers, and a seller rejects any offer below
p. In even periods each seller demands 1, and the buyer rejects any demand
more than δsp. And, p = δs
1−δb
1−δbδs .
As per the above equilibrium, all the sellers accept the offer of p in the first pe-
riod. If any seller deviates and rejects the offer, he obtains the Rubinstein(1982)
payoff, 1−δb1−δbδs , in the next period. Given the value of p, this deviation is not
profitable.
Since k is arbitrarily chosen, there exists an equilibrium such that the buyer
obtains almost entire surplus even when he does not have any outside option. For
example, let us fix k = 0.001. There exists an equilibrium such that the buyer
obtains 1 − k = 0.999. When lim δs → 1, 0.001 → 0, and hence δb − δs → 0+.
Clearly, an outside option will be more or less ineffective in improving buyer’s
payoff. Under limiting conditions, even an infinitesimal difference in
the discouning factors of the buyer and the sellers is enough to ren-
der an outside option ineffective. Hence, the result of Roy Chowdhury
and Sengupta(2012) is extremely sensitive to even infinitesimal difference in the
discount factors of the buyer and sellers under the limiting conditions.
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